Li De
Li De
(September 28, 1900 - August 15, 1974), formerly known as
Otto Braun
Otto Braun was born in ismanin, a suburb of Munich, Germany.
The intelligence agents sent to China by the Communist International were military advisers employed by the Communist Party of China during the period of the Red Army. In the spring of 1932, he was sent to China by the general staff of the Soviet army to deliver the funds to zorg. In the autumn of the same year, he arrived in Shanghai and worked in the Far East Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (in Shanghai). Later, Otto Braun "made military judgments and suggestions" and began to participate in the strategic guidance of China's revolutionary war.
On August 15, 1974, Li De died at the age of 74.
Life of the characters
Li De was born in Munich, Germany on September 28, 1900 and died on August 15, 1974.
He joined the German Communist Party during the first World War. In 1918, he participated in the establishment of the Bavarian Soviet. He was arrested and imprisoned by the German government in 1926. In 1928, he escaped to the Soviet Union and studied in volongzhi military academy. After graduating in the spring of 1932, he worked in the Oriental Department of the Communist International. Because he was familiar with Wang Ming, he was sent to Northeast China by the general staff of the Soviet Red Army to collect Japanese military information.
In September 1933, he served as military adviser of the Central Military Commission of the Soviet Republic of China. In directing the Red Army's operations, we carried out the strategy and tactics of "left" adventurism and opposed guerrilla warfare, which resulted in the failure of the fifth anti "encirclement and suppression" campaign of the Red Army. At the beginning of the Long March, the Red Army was one of the top three military leaders.
In January 1935, the power to command the Red Army was revoked at the Zunyi Meeting. After the long march with the red army arrived in Northern Shaanxi. At the beginning of the Anti Japanese War, he was director of the editorial board of military research of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and professor of Yan'an Anti Japanese military and Political University.
I went to Moscow in the summer of 1939. During the Second World War, he joined the Soviet Red Army. He taught in krasnogorsk from 1941 to 1948.
He returned to the German Democratic Republic to settle down in 1949 and devoted himself to translation. In 1964, he was chief editor of German edition of Lenin's works. It distorts the historical facts of Chinese revolution to a certain extent.
Anecdotes of characters
Li De is an important name in the history of the long march of the Red Army. It was because of his wrong command that the Red Army was forced to make a strategic shift and paid a heavy price at the beginning of the long march.
In the spring of 1932, at the age of 32, Otto Braun graduated from the Military Academy of vorongze in the Soviet Union. Two weeks later, he was sent to China by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He wore a suit, an Austrian passport and a pseudonym of stolov. He took the express train through Siberia and went to Harbin via Manzhouli. After meeting Herman sibrell, the head of the Soviet secret intelligence agency here, he quickly rushed to Dalian and then transferred to Shanghai by boat. The purpose of his visit is to undertake the task of sending money to save people for the zorg group, the intelligence agency of the general staff of the Soviet Red Army in China. He was Li De, who later served as the military adviser of the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army. His real identity was an agent. Li De did not stay in Shanghai immediately after he completed the task of sending money to save people in Shanghai. In his later years, he said in his memoirs, "in order to understand the situation, I traveled many times, including to Shanghai. It was not until the autumn of 1932 that I finally moved there."
He arrived in Shanghai in the autumn of that year and worked in the Far East Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (in Shanghai). Since Manfred stern, the military representative of the Communist International in China and the general military adviser of the CPC Central Committee, did not arrive in Shanghai, Otto Braun "had to make military judgments and suggestions" from the first day and began to participate in the strategic guidance of China's revolutionary war.
At the end of 1932, under the ruling pressure of the Kuomintang, according to the instructions of the Far East Bureau of the Communist International, the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai was finally transferred to the Central Soviet Area of Jiangxi with Bogu, Luofu and Chen Yun. Before leaving, Bogu and Lop took the initiative to ask yurt, the head of the Far East Bureau of the Communist International, to send Li De to the Soviet Area as a military adviser. Li De himself agreed with it in a calculated way. The only condition he put forward was to ask the Executive Committee of the Communist International to issue a corresponding instruction.
At the beginning of 1933, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved from Shanghai to the central base. In September of the same year, he came to Ruijin and began to use his Chinese name, Li De.
In September 1933, Li De was allowed to enter Ruijin Central Soviet Area of Jiangxi Province from Shanghai via Shantou, accompanied by Dong Jianwu, an underground member of the Communist Party disguised as pastor wang, as a military adviser of the Communist International. He just repeated the mistakes of "personal representative responsibility system" and "clear leadership responsibility". He lived in an "independent house" specially arranged by Wu Xiuquan, who served as his interpreter and enjoyed a good life everywhere Under the authority of "foreign imperial envoy" and "supreme emperor", every word was regarded as an imperial edict. With the failure of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign of the Red Army, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, together with the workers and peasants, was forced to give up the Central Soviet Area, make a great strategic shift, and begin the 25000 Li Long March.
Although Li De came to the Soviet Area with a good wish to help the Chinese people's liberation cause, his wrong intervention and command caused great losses to the Communist Party of China. During the fifth anti encirclement and suppression campaign, Bogu, the person in charge of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, handed over the military command of the Red Army to Li De. This consultant, who had studied for three years at the Military Academy of vorongzhi in the Soviet Union and had only experience in street and barricade warfare, did not care about China's national conditions and the actual situation of the war. He sat in his house and directed the battle according to the rules and regulations in his textbooks. As a result, he repeatedly lost the fight against "encirclement and suppression" and forced the Red Army to withdraw from the Central Soviet area. However, he himself only commanded one cavalry brigade and made the Red Army step on the road On the solemn and stirring journey of the long march.
At the beginning of the Long March, Li De was one of the members of the "three man regiment" in charge of military command, and his mistakes in military command were fully exposed again. On the one hand, he emphasized confidentiality and failed to mobilize the strategic shift; on the other hand, he adopted passive evasion and escapism in the retreat, which caused heavy losses to the Central Red Army at the beginning of the long march.
Mao Zedong pointed out pointedly: "Li De did not understand China's national conditions, nor did he understand the situation of the Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army. He did not conduct investigation and research, and had to agree with his opinions. He mechanically applied the strategies and tactics that were effective in the Soviet Union but not feasible in China A series of wrong military strategies and tactics of Li De, Bo Gu and others have made us suffer a lot and pay a heavy price of blood. "
The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, held in Zunyi from January 15 to 17, 1935, profoundly analyzed and criticized Bogu and Li De's mistakes in military command. Li De looked depressed and refused to accept criticism. Shortly after the Zunyi Meeting, a three member military command group composed of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang was established, thus formally ending the military command of Li De and Bo Gu over the Red Army.
Since then, on the Long March, although Li De no longer had military command, he still attended the meetings of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee many times. On June 26, 1935, at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held in Lianghekou, north of MaoGong, Sichuan Province, Li De explicitly agreed with the CPC Central Committee's policy of going north to Gansu to resist Japan and opposed Zhang Guotao's going south. From July to August 1935, the Red Army University was established, and Li De was sent to teach military theory. Soon after, there was an incident in which Li te, the chief of education of the Red Army University and the former chief of staff of the Fourth Front Army, lured the students of the Fourth Front Army to flee with Zhang Guotao. Li De and Li te waged a resolute struggle. He was right to adhere to the Central Committee's policy of going north to resist Japan. No one was allowed to pull the troops away without Mao Zedong's consent. During the quarrel, Mao Zedong rushed to the scene and said, "if you can't tie them up, let them go."
In October 1935, Li De arrived in Northern Shaanxi with the Red Army. In August 1939, Li De left Yan'an and returned to Moscow. As a witness of the Long March, Li De gave a positive evaluation of the long march. In his opinion, "although the long march has made great sacrifices, politically, it is still a victory for the Chinese Red Army. The Red Army resisted the enemy who had a strong advantage, broke through the enemy's solid positions and heavy encirclement, and attacked the enemy dozens of times and harassed him hundreds of times. The Red Army traveled more than 10000 kilometers across 12 provinces, 18 mountains and 24 rivers. This is an indelible achievement and a clear proof of the great courage, tenacious perseverance and revolutionary enthusiasm of all the soldiers of the Chinese Red Army - the peasant army under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. "
Romance
Li De, 33, is energetic and shows a stronger desire for courtship than the Oriental. General Chen Shigui later recalled: "Li De just came to the army and put forward a very funny condition. In China, especially in the Red Army, it was a bit ridiculous." Although Bogu was obedient to Li Deyan, he still considered the influence and did not comply with it for the time being. In fact, Li De had a wife before he came to China. In 1924, Li De did intelligence work in the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, met a young woman named Olga benario, and absorbed her into the party. Then they became husband and wife. This was Li De's first marriage.
Soon there was a case of Li De harassing women. It was noon one day, Li De was dressed neatly, his beard was clean, his waist was girded, he rode on his horse and went straight to the station of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China. It turned out that he took a fancy to a woman league cadre working here. In full view of the public, Li De got off the horse, quickly walked up to the girl group leader, showed his love in German and said, "you are so beautiful, I like you so much, I need you so much!" Although he didn't understand Li De's words, his hot eyes made the lesbian feel uncomfortable.
At this time, the husband of the female league cadre came, who was also the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Chinese PinYin : Li De
Li De